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Abstract: The objective of this study is to develop a corporate financial optimization 
model, based on the theoretical foundations of, and for integrating, the crucial issues 
in accounting and finance such as agency and information asymmetry and the use of 
accounting information to mitigate the problems, which can give appropriate financial 
strategies relevant for the contemporary business world. There are a good number of 
financial models in the existing literature. However, as important issues relevant to 
financial management for corporations are emerging, it is essential to develop a 
financial optimization model that can embed and address these emerging issues and 
can prescribe a set of financial management strategies, which are relevant in the 
current situations of corporations shaped by these emerging issues. This study 
formulates an applied integrated financial optimization problem to investigate the 
extent to which the financial model designs optimal financial strategies that can 
mitigate agency problems and provide a basis for sound accounting practices, leading 
to the optimal company value in real life situations. Generally, this study concludes 
that the integrated financial model can provide economic significance when 
formulating financial strategies for mitigating agency problems and maximizing 
company value. It also provides new insights into sound accounting practices should 
be implemented in an integrated, large-scale real-life financial strategy. This paper 
contributes to corporate financial modeling by developing a model based on the 
multidisciplinary literature, including contemporary accounting, agency theory, and 
management science, by providing a new corporate finance model, which is 
appropriate for modeling and addressing some crucial contemporary issues in 
corporate finance in the current world. 
 
Keywords: Accounting Information, Agency Theory, Agency Problems, Optimization 
Model, Corporate Finance, Financial Management. 
 
Intisari: Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk mengembangkan model optimasi 
keuangan perusahaan, berdasarkan pada landasan teoritis, dan untuk 
mengintegrasikan isu-isu penting dalam akuntansi dan keuangan seperti asimetri 
agensi dan informasi dan penggunaan informasi akuntansi untuk mengurangi 
masalah, yang dapat memberikan strategi keuangan yang tepat yang relevan untuk 
dunia bisnis kontemporer. Ada sejumlah model keuangandalamliteratur yang 
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sudahada. Namun, karena isu-isu penting yang relevan dengan manajemen keuangan 
untuk perusahaan sedang berkembang, penting untuk mengembangkan model 
pengoptimalan keuangan yang dapat menanamkan dan mengatasi masalah yang 
muncul dan dapat meresepkan serangkaian strategi manajemen keuangan, yang 
relevan dalam situasi perusahaan saat ini. dibentuk oleh isu-isu yang muncul ini. 
Studi ini merumuskan masalah optimasi keuangan terintegrasi yang diterapkan untuk 
menyelidiki sejauh mana model keuangan merancang strategi keuangan yang optimal 
yang dapat mengurangi masalah keagenan dan menyediakan dasar untuk praktik 
akuntansi yang baik, yang mengarah ke nilai perusahaan yang optimal dalam situasi 
kehidupan nyata. Umumnya, penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa model keuangan 
terintegrasi dapat memberikan signifikansi ekonomi ketika merumuskan strategi 
keuangan untuk mengurangi masalah keagenan dan memaksimalkan nilai 
perusahaan. Ini juga memberikan wawasan baru ke dalam praktik-praktik akuntansi 
yang baik harus diterapkan dalam strategi finansial kehidupan nyata berskala besar 
yang terintegrasi. Makalah ini memberikan kontribusi untuk pemodelan keuangan 
perusahaan dengan mengembangkan model berdasarkan literatur multidisiplin, 
termasuk akuntansi kontemporer, teori keagenan dan ilmu manajemen, dengan 
menyediakan model keuangan perusahaan baru, yang sesuai untuk pemodelan dan 
mengatasi beberapa isu kontemporer yang krusial dalam keuangan perusahaan. di 
dunia saat ini. 
 
Kata kunci: Informasi Akuntansi, Teori Agensi, Masalah Keagenan, Model Optimasi, 




Banking companies as financial institutions operate in a specific business 
environment that has unique risk characteristics compared to other industries. These 
are related to the vast array of uncertainties exposed in their operations, including the 
rapid changes in the financial market, financial regulatory reforms and the 
globalization of financial flows which can cause banks to become the most troubled 
institutions in economies (Van Greuning and Bratanovic 2009; Rethel and Sinclair 
2012). Based on the perspectives of business and economics, banks are also facing the 
common problem, which is the way individuals (or business entities as a whole) 
should allocate their limited resources and uncertain business environment to satisfy 
their unlimited and competing desires; hence there is a necessity for the decision 
makers to formulate the best strategy to deal with, through an optimal corporate 




financial model (Moss 2010). However, in achieving the best strategies that can 
optimize the financial performance, companies cannot neglect the crucial emerging 
issues in accounting, finance, capital market and business environments such as 
agency problems and information asymmetry and the use of financial accounting 
information to mitigate those problems, as discussed below. 
According to the agency theory perspective, modern corporations, including 
publicly-owned banks, are facing agency problems sourced from the asymmetric 
information between a principal (i.e. shareholders) and an agent (i.e. managers) in the 
decision-making process, which might lead to an incomplete contract as the 
consequence of random disturbances on the outcome of their decisions, including 
inefficient behavior of all parties (i.e. shareholders and managers) in satisfying their 
own interests (Holmstrom and Tirole 1989; Schroeck 2002). Eisenhardt (1989) argues 
that, in the presence of asymmetric information, the agency problem can create 
incomplete contracting with the organization leads to the goal conflict, increased 
outcomes uncertainty and decreased outcomes measurability. Thus, decision makers 
have to consider all contributing variables in the process that can address and mitigate 
the agency problems, hence can ensure a complete contracting between shareholders 
and managers. 
Related to the issue, Brown (2011) argue that both parties (management and 
shareholders) need to share some information about the actual financial position and 
performance of the company that might be relevant and can affect their decisions 
through a sound accounting information system. This system can provide accounting 
information that summarizes and inform the outcomes of management's past activities 
as an essential basis for estimating future performance on which shareholders may use 
as a basis for their investment decision. Hence, financial accounting information 
provides a significant role as intermediaries between managers and shareholders in 
communicating financial position and performance of the companies and hence 
reducing information asymmetry (Drever et al. 2007; Scott 2015). For banking 
companies specifically, the use of financial accounting information in developing 
financial strategies must also be supported by other key elements in banking financial 
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management including the attraction of firm resources, liquidity and capital 
management, risk management and asset-liability management, hence the companies 
can achieve efficient allocation and management of financial resources that are 
necessary for their survival and growth (Kosmidou and Zopounidis 2004; Van 
Greuning and Bratanovic 2009; Rezaee 2011).  
Previous studies suggest that corporate financial models have been developed to 
provide the best strategies to achieve the highest and most efficient financial 
performance. For example, Ijiri et al. (1963) develop a budgeting and financial 
planning model by employing a linear programming technique and integrate this 
technique with a double-entry accounting system. This model formulates strategies of 
planning and identifies the transaction flows that would bring a company to the best 
possible financial position at the end of an operational period. Further, Carleton et al. 
(1973) use accounting relationships to develop a more integrated model for corporate 
financial management, which emphasizes not only on solving management problems 
but also fulfilling shareholders’ interests, reflected in the objective function by 
maximizing the value of the owners’ equity. This model is probably the most-
integrated model in accounting and finance areas, as it has been cited and adopted by 
several studies into financial strategy formulations (e.g., Ho and Lee 2004; Lee et al. 
2009; Nuryanah and Islam 2015). However, none of these models are built in the 
banking context. 
Early 1960s, Chambers, and Charnes (1961) employ a linear programming model 
to solve balance sheet management problems for banking companies, by maximizing 
profit subject to satisfying the minimum capital adequacy and reserve requirement. 
This study is followed and extended by studies by Cohen and Hammer (1967), which 
applies an intertemporal linear programming model as a managerial apparatus to 
obtain the optimal asset management decisions in a commercial bank and Crane 
(1971), which proposes a stochastic programming approach to solve the bond portfolio 
management problem under uncertainty economic condition. In further studies, the 
bank's management becomes more complex and is often challenged by somewhat 
competing and conflicting goals such as returns maximization and minimization of 




risk associated with alternative asset-liability portfolio combination. Therefore, the 
proposed model formulates the objective function as minimizing the deviations from 
satisfying all management goals. This technique is implemented in further advanced 
research in the similar area, for example, Langen (1989), Jedicke et al. (1994), 
Korhonen (2001), Kosmidou and Zopounidis (2004) and Chakroun and Abid (2013). 
Nevertheless, none of these studies consider the contemporary issues that are 
crucial and remains relevant in the current development of corporate finance theory, 
including agency problems and information asymmetry and the use of accounting 
information, which can significantly affect the way a banking company formulates its 
financial strategies. Motivated by the gap, this study strives to develop a financial 
model for banks, which is based on the agency theory to address the issues of agency 
problems and information asymmetry, by using an accounting information system. 
The development of the financial model is aimed to investigate further the way this 
approach can mitigate the agency problems, strengthen the financial position and 
improve the financial performance in the sense of company value. Accordingly, this 
study can extend the body of knowledge in accounting, finance, management science 
and financial management for financial institutions. 
The investigation and analyzes are conducted using an integrated financial 
optimization approach within the framework of agency theory, accounting, and 
finance. This methodology is chosen due to its usefulness in providing an integrated 
understanding of the way agency relationships, and sound accounting information 
system should be incorporated into a corporate financial model to achieve the optimal 
financial strategies leading to maximum company performance. To address the 
research issues above, this study conducts a case study by proposing a prescriptive 
economic optimization model, applicable for corporation-form banking companies, 
where the issues are of particular concern. Through a numerical case applied in the 
model, this study strives to explain how the model can be implemented in practice and 
what results and implications can be obtained from the model for formulating 
strategies in a banking company. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The conceptual and modeling 
framework for developing an integrated financial optimization model is discussed in 
the next section. Section 3 discusses the research methodology and empirical data. 
Section 4 presents the development of the financial optimization model in a 
corporation as a case study. Section 5 presents the model testing and analysis tool for 
solving the linear programming problem. Section 6 discusses analyses, discussions, 
and implications of the results of testing the model. Section 7 presents the model's 
verification and validation processes to examine the plausibility of the results and to 
generalize the model. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Agency Theory, Information Asymmetry and Accounting Information 
As introduced by Berle et al. (1932), the agency theory argues that in a modern 
corporation, the separation between the owners and management has led to agency 
conflicts, where the agent (management) acquires more information and hence tends 
to act for their benefit, rather than satisfying the interests of the principal 
(shareholders). This conflict creates agency costs, arising from the principal 
monitoring the unusual activities of the agent and ensuring that the agent acts on their 
behalf and from the losses which occur as a result of the contrasting decisions taken by 
both the agent and the principal, as in the suboptimal allocation of resources (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). From the corporate finance perspective, the agency theory 
through its signaling mechanism provides implications for corporate financing 
decisions, including the dividend policy, capital structure and so on (Copeland et al. 
2005; Brealey et al. 2016).  
According to the accounting perspective, the signaling mechanism represents the 
essential governance mechanism that can provide interested parties with information 
about a company’s financial position and performance. This is achieved through a 
sound accounting information system, which produces financial accounting reports 
that summarize the results of the management's past activities as an essential basis for 
the estimation of future performance, which shareholders may use as a basis for their 




investment decisions(Brown et al. 2011). Furthermore, as accounting reports provide 
observable and verifiable information about the managers' performance, the agency 
theory argues that accounting reports have an essential role in helping monitor and 
control the actions of managers; hence the incentive contract needs to be linked with 
the accounting information (Scott 2015). In this way, the accounting information plays 
a significant role as an intermediary between managers and shareholders for 
communicating the financial position and performance of the company and hence 
reducing agency and information asymmetry problems (Drever et al. 2007; Scott 
2015). 
 
2.2 Financial Optimization for Achieving Best Financial Strategies 
The existing literature reveals that the optimization approach is widely used as a 
managerial apparatus for modeling decision-making process. The use of this approach 
in various areas of strategic decision-making has been emerging since the approach 
itself is found up to present time. The very first corporate financial model as a tool for 
management information system is proposed by Gershefski (1969). This model can be 
used generally to prepare short-term profit plans and long-range projections by 
simulating the key financial indicators including income statement, capital investment 
schedule, statement of stockholders’ equity and earnings employed, financial and 
operating summary, tax report and rate-of-return analysis. The model also can be used 
to address further problems of management interests, including enabling management 
to react quickly to events and to revise income estimates and other aspects of 
performance based on available budget. Further, Carleton et al. (1973) propose a 
financial model in which focuses not only solving management problems but also 
fulfilling shareholders' interest, reflected on an objective function by maximizing the 
value of owners' equity.  
Although there has been an extensive development of corporate financial 
strategies employing the financial optimization model (e.g., Ijiri et al. 1963; Carleton 
et al. 1973; Nuryanah and Islam 2015), none of these has been developed under the 
specific assumptions of asymmetric information and agency problems. Accordingly, 
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the existing models overlook the integration of the agency's relationship and incentive 
mechanisms into the model to capture the real problems of the decision-making 
process in a modern corporation, characterized by the underlying problems of agency 
and asymmetric information. Although some theoretical models for solving the agency 
problem in the accounting and finance areas have been developed (Khan 2015; 
Kanodia 2014; Demski 2008; Tirole 2001), these models have not been implemented 
in an integrated real-life applicable financial model. Consequently, there is a gap 
between these theoretical agency models (focusing on one or only a few variables) and 
the real world (Douma and Schreuder 2008); hence a new financial model applicable 
to a real-life, large-scale organization could provide an understanding of the agency 
theory’s applications in resolving agency problems and achieving a more efficient 
governance structure. 
 
3. Research Method 
A financial optimization model is a mathematical model built to find the best 
possible strategy for a set of financial decisions. These decisions are restricted by a set 
of constraints on the values of the variables, such as sources of funding, capital, value 
of assets and so on. As the model is designed to achieve a specific goal from the 
limited amount of available resources, it can be used to support the processes of 
financial engineering and the extent to which they can develop sound financial 
strategies and build a strong institutional financial structure(Morris and Daley 2009; 
Zenios 2007). 
The Linear Programming (LP) model is one of the mathematical optimization 
approaches with the main goal is to determine the optimal value of the decision 
variables that can maximize or minimize the objective’s function. The result of the 
model is the best possible solution out of a set of alternatives under the restrictions of 
the constraints on the value of the variables(Koo 1977). Generally, a typical linear 
programming model for a maximization problem can be simply stated in the following 
form(Williams 2013): 
 




Maximise 𝑧𝑥 =  𝑐1𝑥1 +  𝑐2𝑥2 + ⋯ +  𝑐𝑛𝑥𝑛 + 𝑑  
 Subject to: 𝑎11𝑥1 +  𝑎12𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑎1𝑛𝑥𝑛  ≤  𝑏1, 
   𝑎𝑚𝑥1 +  𝑎𝑚2𝑥2 + ⋯ +  𝑎𝑚𝑛𝑥𝑛  ≤  𝑏𝑚, 
   𝑥𝑗  ≥ 0,      𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛, 
 Where𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑛 are the variables and 𝑎𝑖𝑗 , 𝑏𝑖, 𝑐𝑗, 𝑑 are given constants 
 
This study simulates the financial model through a numerical case applied in the 
model, to explain how the model can be implemented in practice and what results and 
implications can be obtained from the proposed model for formulating strategies. This 
study conducts case-study analysis as its strategy, due to its usefulness in providing in-
depth analysis of the investigated research phenomena, in a banking company with a 
real financial data to show the applicability of the model. Further, a robust model 
should accommodate the sustainability issue of the financial trends in forecasting the 
future performance. As company value maximization can be influenced by the long-
term nature of investing and financing activities, the effects of business cycles and 
other nonrecurring factors cannot be reliably measured in a one-year period analysis 
(Subramanyam and Wild 2014). Therefore, to satisfy the model, this study will use the 
5-year financial data sourced from audited financial statements (i.e., the accounting 
numbers are valid and free from noise). All this data can be obtained from the 
company's annual reports. Any data which cannot be obtained from public sources are 
calculated and simulated based on reasonable assumptions from historical data and 
previous studies. 
 
4. Model Development and Specification1 
4.1 The Variables and Parameters 
As the primary purpose of modeling financial management for banks is 
essentially for balance sheet management (Güven and Persentili 1997; Chi et al. 2007; 
Birge and Júdice 2013), the variables used in developing the financial model are 
                                                     
1A complete list of the definitions of the variables and parameters is given in Appendix 1 
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mainly specified for that purpose. Accordingly, the variables of the model are 
categorized into four types, including decision variables of the objective function, 
decision variables representing assets, decision variables representing liabilities and 
other variables, which are derived from the accounts reported in the accounting 
system, as presented as follows. 
1. Decision variables of the objective function 
𝒅𝒕 : Dividend paid in period t 
2. Variables representing assets (𝑋1𝑛) 
𝑿𝟏𝟏𝒕 : Loans, bills discounted and other receivables in period t 
𝑿𝟏𝟐𝒕 : Cash and liquid assets in period t 
𝑿𝟏𝟑𝒕 : Receivables due from other financial institutions in period t 
𝑿𝟏𝟒𝒕 : Securities in period t 
3. Variables representing liabilities (𝑋2𝑛) 
𝑿𝟐𝟏𝒕 : Deposits and other public borrowings in period t 
𝑿𝟐𝟐𝒕 : Payables due to other financial institutions in period t 
𝑿𝟐𝟑𝒕 : Debt issues in period t 
𝑿𝟐𝟒𝒕 : Loan capital in period t 
4. Other variables (𝑋3) 
𝑿𝟑𝒕 : Remuneration paid to executives in period t 
 
The choice of variables is justified under the main assumptions that 1) the 
company consistently pays a dividend to its shareholders annually; 2) other elements 
of its balance sheet, including its non-interest earning assets, non-interest bearing 
liabilities and equities, are known based on the historical financial reports; and 3) the 
company does not issue new shares. Hence there is no change in the number of shares. 
 
4.2 Objective Function 
In this study, the proposed model is aimed at achieving the goal of corporate 
financial management, which is maximizing the company’s value. As the model is 




developed within the framework of the agency theory, the objective function should 
reflect the shareholders’ interest and relate with the concepts and parameters which are 
essential for the stakeholders to evaluate the management’s performance(Stern 1972; 
Van Horne and Wachowicz 2005). The previous literature suggests that the most 
common method for valuing a company is by using the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) 
method, which reflects the intrinsic value of the company, based on the projection of 
all the future cash flows which could be made available for investors (Titman et al. 
2014; Brealey et al. 2016). However, as the model is applied to a banking company, 
the company’s valuation method is adjusted to the banking context, by assuming that 
the sources of capital only consist of its equity capital, hence the company’s valuation 
method in this study is through its equity’s valuation by discounting any free cash 
flows to equity investors at the cost of equity (Damodaran 2013). Accordingly, based 
on the dividend discount model, the value per share of equity is specified by the 
present value of the expected dividend to be paid to the shareholders, discounted on 
the cost of equity capital during the observation periods, plus the present terminal 
price value of the equity, discounted by the cost of the equity capital at the end of 
observation period Accordingly, the objective function is expressed in a mathematical 










]                                                                            (1) 2 
Where 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡: dividend per share at period t 
 𝑘𝑒: cost of equity used as the discount rate 
 𝐸𝑛: the terminal value of equity at the end of the observation period n 
 
Constraints 
                                                     
2The calculation of dividend per share, 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡 =
𝑑𝑡
𝑁𝑡
    and 𝐸𝑇 =
𝑑𝑇(1+𝑔)
(𝑘𝑒−𝑔)
; where 𝑔 is the expected 
dividend growth rate; and 𝑘𝑒 is calculated by using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). 
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a. Accounting identity constraints 
Income Statement 
An income statement shows the result of the operational activities of a company 
during the accounting period t. In the banking context, performance is represented 
by net income, which is measured by the sum of the interest income generated 
from the assets (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑡) and the interest costs paid for all the funding sources 
(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡), with all the operating expenses and related taxes subtracted. If the 
corporate tax rate in period t is given as 𝜏𝑡, this relationship is presented as follows: 
𝑁𝐼𝑡 = [(1 − 𝜏𝑡)(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡 + 𝑂𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑡 − 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑡 − 𝑂𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑡 − 𝑋3𝑡)
− 𝑃𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡]    (2) 
where:  
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑡 = 𝑦𝑙𝑋11𝑡−1 + 𝑦𝑟𝑋12𝑡−1 + 𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑋13𝑡−1
+ 𝑦𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑋14𝑡−1                                                (3) 
 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡 = 𝑖𝑑𝑋21𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑎𝑝𝑋22𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑑𝑏𝑋23𝑡−1 +
𝑖𝑙𝑐𝑋24𝑡−1                                               (4) 
Net income in period t (𝑁𝐼𝑡) should be a positive number, as it cannot be less than 
zero. Substituting equations (3) and (4) into equation (2), mathematically, this 
constraint can be expressed as 𝑁𝐼𝑡 ≥ 0, or 
(1 − 𝜏𝑡)[𝑦𝑙𝑋11𝑡−1 + 𝑦𝑟𝑋12𝑡−1 + 𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑋13𝑡−1 + 𝑦𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑋14𝑡−1
− (𝑖𝑑𝑋21𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑎𝑝𝑋22𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑑𝑏𝑋23𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑙𝑐𝑋24𝑡−1) + 𝑂𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑡
− 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑡 − 𝑂𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝑥𝑡] − 𝑃𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡
≥ 0                                         (5) 
Balance Sheet 
This constraint reflects the position of the sources and uses of the funds as shown 
in the balance sheet(Ho and Lee 2004). Following the basic accounting equation, 
the relationship of the financial flows in year t is presented as: 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡 −  𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡
=  𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡                                                                                         (6) 





𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡 = 𝑋11𝑡 + 𝑋12𝑡 + 𝑋13𝑡 + 𝑋14𝑡
+ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐼𝐴𝑡                                                               (7) 
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝑋21𝑡 + 𝑋22𝑡 + 𝑋23𝑡 + 𝑋24𝑡
+ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐼𝐿𝑡                                                         (8) 
 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 = 𝑆𝐶𝑡 + 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝑅𝑃𝑡−1 +
∆𝑅𝑃𝑡                                                                              (9) 
𝑆𝐶𝑡 denotes the share capital in period t, 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡 denotes the reserves in period t, and 
𝑅𝑃𝑡 denotes the retained profit in period t.∆𝑅𝑃𝑡or the increase in retained earnings 
is obtained from subtracting net income in period t (𝑁𝐼𝑡) with the dividend paid in 
period t (𝑑𝑡). Substituting equations (7), (8) and (9) into equation (6), accordingly, 
the theoretical balance sheet identity or the fund availability constraints (Brodt 
1978) for the model are as follows: 
(𝑋11𝑡 + 𝑋12𝑡 + 𝑋13𝑡 + 𝑋14𝑡) − (𝑋21𝑡 + 𝑋22𝑡 + 𝑋23𝑡 + 𝑋24𝑡) + 𝑑𝑡
= 𝑆𝐶𝑡 + 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝑅𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐼𝐿𝑡 − 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐼𝐴𝑡
+ 𝑁𝐼𝑡                               (10) 
Cash flows identity constraints 
This constraint shows the flow of cash produced in one accounting period and 
becomes the essential element for maintaining the equilibrium of the financial 
model (Morris and Daley 2009). The cash flow is represented by the Net Cash 
Inflow (NCI), which is available to be added to the cash account or to be paid as a 
dividend (Hamilton and Moses 1973). The NCI consist of 1) net Cash Flow from 
Operations (CFO); 2) net Cash Flow from Investments, assumed to be negative due 
to the active investments (CFI); and 3) net Cash Flow from Financing (CFF). This 
can be written as: 
𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑡
= 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 − 𝐶𝐹𝐼𝑡
+ 𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑡                                                                                                  (11) 
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Inserting the accounting elements of CFO, CFI, and CFF into NCI, the theoretical 
cash flow's identity or cash availability constraint (Brodt 1978) is given as: 
[(1 − 𝜏𝑡)(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡 + 𝑂𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑡 − 𝑂𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑡 − 𝑋3𝑡) − 𝑃𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡
− (∆𝑋11𝑡 + ∆𝑋13𝑡 + ∆𝑋14𝑡) + (∆𝑋21𝑡 + ∆𝑋22𝑡)]
− [(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1) + (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑡−1)]
+ [(𝑋23𝑡 − 𝑋23𝑡−1) + (𝑋24𝑡 − 𝑋24𝑡−1) + ∆𝑆𝐶𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡]
≥ 0                                            (12) 
 
b. Agency relationships and governance mechanisms 
Executives remuneration/compensation scheme 
As discussed previously, the agency problem is characterized by the information 
asymmetry where the agent (i.e., the manager) tends to have more information than 
the principal (i.e., the shareholders) and the agent tends to do moral hazard by 
utilizing the unobservable information for their interests (Holmstrom 1979). In 
order to resolve the agency problem between the shareholders and managers, the 
principal needs to design an incentive contract (i.e. a remuneration scheme) that 
can motivate the managers to take actions on behalf of the shareholders’ interests 
and allows shareholders to directly monitor the managers’ performance (McGuigan 
et al. 2014; Samuelson and Marks 2015).  
This study specifies the incentive contract constraints in two forms: managerial 
remuneration and participative constraints. The managerial incentive plan is 
represented as 𝑊 = 𝐴 + 𝐵𝑋; where 𝑊 is the agent's incentives, and 𝑋 represents 
the agent’s performance which is measured by a quantifiable output, such as the 
profits, share price, productivity, etc. The parameter 𝐴 symbolizes the fixed 
component of the agent's remuneration, and 𝐵 symbolizes the amount of 
remuneration that is tied to the agent's performance (𝑋). 
To simplify the integration of the managerial incentives constraint into the 
model, this study uses the simplest, yet accurate and informative accounting-based 
measure, namely net income, as the basis of the manager’s compensation scheme. 




The measure is chosen due to its usefulness to shareholders in providing signals 
about the management’s performance (Guidry et al. 1999; Scott 2015). This 
constraint is written as follows: 
𝑋3𝑡
= 𝑎𝑡
+ 𝜒𝑡𝑁𝐼𝑡                                                                                                                        (13) 
where 𝑋3𝑡:  Total remuneration paid in period t 
 𝑎𝑡:  Fixed component of remuneration paid in period t 
𝜒𝑡:  Variable-compensation payout ratio in period t 
Furthermore, the principal should offer the agent the opportunity to generate 
incentives, at least as high as the agent’s threshold, or as it is generally known, the 
participative constraint (Samuelson and Marks 2015). The incentives paid should 
not exceed the maximum payment that the shareholders can afford to pay to the 
managers without decreasing their efficiency level (Bryan et al. 2000). These 
constraints can be formulated as follows: 
𝑋3𝑡
≥ 𝑋3min(𝑡)                                                                                                                           (14)  
𝑋3𝑡
≤ 𝑋3max (𝑡)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                                                                                                                          (15) 
Minimum dividend policy 
Following the flow of funds in the NCI equation (refer to equation 12), 𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑡 
represents the net cash inflow in period t which is usually available to be added to 
the cash accounts (∆𝑋12𝑡) and to be distributed as a dividend in period t (Hamilton 
and Moses 1973; Morris and Daley 2009). To signal the managerial confidence in 
earnings growth and to meet the shareholders’ expectations (Dickens et al. 2002; 
Arnott and Asness 2003), the financial model should accommodate the policy on 
minimum dividend to be paid to the shareholders. This policy constraint can be 
formulated as follows: 
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𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑡 − ∆𝑋12𝑡 − 𝛿𝑡𝑁𝐼𝑡
≥ 0                                                                                                      (16) 
where 𝛿𝑡is the dividend payout ratio at period t. 
Maximum dividend policy 
The company needs to ensure that it has sufficient retained earnings (∆𝑅𝑃𝑡) 
available for reinvestment in the future and to pay dividends to the shareholders. 
Accordingly, the company's profit (i.e., 𝑁𝐼𝑡) must be sufficient to fulfill both 
purposes during the accounting period(Lee et al. 2009; Damodaran 2013). This 
relationship can be expressed by a mathematical equation as follows: 
𝑁𝐼𝑡
≥ 𝑑𝑡
+ ∆𝑅𝑃𝑡                                                                                                                         (17) 
Financial performance constraints 
One of the essential principles of financial management and governance 
mechanisms is ensuring that financial outcomes, as products of the accounting 
system, can be reliably used as the basis for formulating managerial remuneration. 
To achieve this goal, managers must maintain the profitability level as high as 
possible to ensure excellent performance and to secure a competitive position in the 
market (Ittner et al. 1997; Indjejikian 1999; Scott 2015). Therefore, the financial 
model needs to integrate a policy that limits the minimum profitability level 
(depicted by the Return on Equity (ROE)), which must not be less than the ROE of 
the profitability of the industry average (Rezaee 2011). Accordingly, this 
relationship can be mathematically written as follows: 
𝑁𝐼𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
≥ 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑑(𝑡)                                                                                   (18) 
Operational efficiency constraint 
The efficiency ratio shows how efficiently a company performs its operational 
activities, as it measures how much of its income is spent on operating expenses 
(Rezaee 2011). To achieve an efficient level of operational activities, managers 




should maintain this ratio as low as possible, as a high-efficiency ratio indicates 
either high operating expenses or a low operational capability to generate income 
(Gardner et al. 2005). The company’s efficiency ratio should be lower than, or 
equal to, the efficiency ratio of the industry average. This constraint is expressed as 
follows: 
𝑂𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑡+𝑋3𝑡
(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡) + 𝑂𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑡
× 100%
≤ 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑(𝑡)                                                              (19) 
Financial sustainability constraint 
The most critical element of a bank's financial performance is its sustained revenue 
growth. Management is often under severe pressure to maintain a satisfactory 
interest margin to be able to survive industry competition. This creates the 
necessity for management to sustainably review all possible sources of revenue 
growth (Rezaee 2011). As this study is simulated through a case study of a bank 
and the purpose of the business model in banking is balance sheet management, the 
direct measure of revenue quality is Net Interest Income (NII). To satisfy long-term 
revenue growth, management should maintain the revenue during period t at a level 
greater than or equal to the revenue in the previous period (t–1), or at least increase 
it by the minimum required revenue growth. Accordingly, the revenue growth 
constraint is formulated as: 
𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑡 − (1 + 𝜑𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑡)𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑡−1
≥ 0                                                                                                (20) 
c. Financial risk management and capital adequacy requirements 
Liquidity risk: Balance sheet quality 
As depository institutions, banks are commonly exposed to a liquidity risk which is 
caused by the unmatched maturity of their assets and liabilities. To insulate against 
this liquidity risk, balance sheet management is a necessity (Lange et al. 2013). 
Some ratios can be used to quantitatively assess the balance sheet’s quality, 
including the loans ratio and the loan-to-deposit ratio (Rezaee 2011). 
The Indonesian Journal of Accounting Research – Jan, Vol. 20 , No.1 , 2017 
134 
 
The loans ratio shows the proportion of loans (𝑋11𝑡) as a percentage of the total 
assets of the bank. This ratio indicates the extent to which assets are devoted to 
loans as opposed to other assets, including cash, securities, and property, plant and 
equipment. To preserve the high quality of assets and hence sustain its position in 
the industry, a bank should maintain its loans ratio within the optimal loans ratio, 
typically based on the historical data or the industry average, expressed as follows: 
𝐿𝑅𝑡
≥ 𝐿𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑡)                                                                                                                          (21) 
and 
𝐿𝑅𝑡
≤ 𝐿𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                                                                                                                             (22) 
Financial distress and bankruptcy risk 
In corporate finance literature, financial distress is described as a condition where a 
company suffers a loss in its value that can be attributed to its deteriorating 
financial strength (Titman et al. 2014). To predict the probability of financial 
distress, positive asset growth can be used as an indicator of the success of a bank 
in protecting its future financial position and hence securing it from financial 
distress. Management should maintain long-term positive asset growth to secure 
the bank’s financial position and hence avoid the risk of bankruptcy and strengthen 
the going-concern aspects of the company in the long term (Morris and Daley 
2009). Accordingly, the total assets in period t (𝑇𝐴𝑡) must be greater than or equal 
to the minimum assets growth required in period t compared to the previous period 
(t–1). Therefore, the asset growth constraint for the model can be written as 
follows: 
𝑇𝐴𝑡 − (1 + 𝜑𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡)𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
≥ 0                                                                                          (23) 
Capital adequacy constraint 
Financial distress, bankruptcy, and other related costs are also strongly related to 
the leverage of a company (Altman and Hotchkiss 2006). Related to the concepts 




of corporate governance and risk management, the leverage ratio is significant for 
assessing the ability of a company to fulfill the interests of its stakeholders. For 
banks, capital is important to protect them against the risk of insolvency and 
financial failure. Capital absorbs unanticipated losses, with enough margin to 
ensure that the institution continues its operations as a going concern and hence 
protects its stakeholders' rights in the long term (BCBS 2011; Lange et al. 2013). 
To ensure that the developed model does not violate the regulation on the capital 
adequacy requirement, the model incorporates the minimum capital adequacy as a 
constraint. Adopting the regulatory framework imposed by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS), the capital adequacy requirement constraints are 
presented as follows: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠3
≥ 8.0%                                                                             (24) 
 
5. Model Testing and Analysis Tool 
To address the issues of this study, the financial optimization problem is solved 
by using numerical data of a banking company, to obtain the best solutions that lead to 
the maximum value of the objective function, which is the value of shareholders’ 
equity. The results of the model are then being compared with the original values 
based on the company’s financial data to obtain the complete figure on how the 
developed model can provide different financial strategies for improving the 
company’s value. Based on the results, the implications of agency concepts, as well as 
accounting and financial management practices integrated into the model are 
investigated in the most meaningful way to make an in-depth analysis of whether or 
not the integrated financial model can contribute towards improving the company’s 
performance. 
The financial model developed in this study is an optimization model which is 
solved using the Analytical Solver Platform v12.5 developed by Frontline Systems for 
                                                     
3 Total risk-adjusted asset is calculated based on the elements determined by the BCBS. 
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Microsoft. The Risk Solver Platform (RSP) provides a combination of optimization 
and simulation capabilities for model solving (Frontline 2013). This software has 
strong technical support for conventional optimization with its simplex LP solver 
engine, which can handle linear programming problems with up to 2,000 variables and 
2,000 constraints. The software includes five built-in algorithms for solving the full 
spectrum of an optimization model. As the present model is a linear programming 
model, the RSP adopted in this study solves the model using an enhanced version of 
the simplex method. 
 
6. Results and Discussion 
Optimal value and book value of share price 
The objective of this study is to investigate to what extent the developed model, based 
on agency relationships and financial accounting practices, can increase a company's 
value and mitigate the agency problems. To generally conclude the result of this study, 
the comparison between the values per share of equity resulting from the model's 
results and the book value of the share price based on the financial reports are 
discussed. 
Based on Table 1, the value per share of equity based on the financial statements, 
or the book value per share of equity, which is calculated by using the formula in 
equation (1), is 38.3138. This value is lower than the optimal value per share of equity 
achieved from the proposed financial model. Based on the results of the developed 
model, the optimal dividend paid to shareholders resulting from the optimization 
procedure achieves a value in the range from 2,412.86 to 4,536.62, with an average 
value of 3,729.28. These results are significantly higher than the actual dividend paid 
to the shareholders based on the historical data from the annual reports which vary 
from 1,738.35 to 3,211.71, with an average of 2,722.58 during the observation period. 
Therefore, the present value of the dividend, which reflects the achieved optimal value 
per share of equity is also higher, with a value of 41.9138. This result implies that the 
proposed financial model has succeeded in improving the value of the company, 
which is reflected in its value per share of equity. 





Table 1.  
The Optimal Results of Model Testing 
 Proposed FM Baseline 
Objective Value 41.9138 38.3138 
Value d1 2,412.86 1,738.35 
Value d2 3,571.03 2,621.55 
Value d3 3,963.84 2,918.27 
Value d4 4,162.04 3,123.00 
Value d5 4,536.62 3,211.71 
Value 𝑋111 436,143.25 466,631.00 
Value 𝑋112 542,633.57 493,459.00 
Value 𝑋113 586,457.45 500,057.00 
Value 𝑋114 723,700.54 525,682.00 
Value 𝑋115 815,259.01 556,648.00 
Value 𝑋121 9,843.29 11,340.00 
Value 𝑋122 12,303.22 10,119.00 
Value 𝑋123 25,887.50 13,241.00 
Value 𝑋124 27,836.83 19,666.00 
Value 𝑋125 52,646.43 20,634.00 
Value 𝑋131 8,886.44 14,421.00 
Value 𝑋132 9,257.89 10,072.00 
Value 𝑋133 47,325.87 10,393.00 
Value 𝑋134 50,889.50 10,886.00 
Value 𝑋135 53,367.82 7,744.00 
Value 𝑋141 163,111.89 49,629.00 
Value 𝑋142 169,929.97 57,910.00 
Value 𝑋143 176,070.31 68,176.00 
Value 𝑋144 245,172.52 77,521.00 
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Value 𝑋145 257,112.42 82,406.00 
Value 𝑋211 277,845.11 368,721.00 
Value 𝑋212 335,417.40 374,663.00 
Value 𝑋213 417,314.13 401,147.00 
Value 𝑋214 451,017.03 437,655.00 
Value 𝑋215 556,564.28 459,429.00 
Value 𝑋221 162,511.21 15,109.00 
Value 𝑋222 172,261.88 12,608.00 
Value 𝑋223 175,707.12 15,899.00 
Value 𝑋224 189,763.69 22,126.00 
Value 𝑋225 201,149.51 25,922.00 
Value 𝑋231 97,507.64 101,819.00 
Value 𝑋232 101,607.76 130,210.00 
Value 𝑋233 107,701.99 118,652.00 
Value 𝑋234 106,857.55 124,712.00 
Value 𝑋235 106,908.42 132,808.00 
Value 𝑋241 15,142.29 12,039.00 
Value 𝑋242 36,783.05 13,513.00 
Value 𝑋243 37,518.72 11,561.00 
Value 𝑋244 40,520.21 10,022.00 
Value 𝑋245 42,951.43 9,687.00 
Value 𝑋31 58.00 58.00 
Value 𝑋32 68.00 68.00 
Value 𝑋33 80.00 71.00 
Value 𝑋34 78.44 55.00 
Value 𝑋35 78.93 50.00 
 
Optimal financial management strategies to improve financial performance  




The results of the proposed financial model are found to be the most optimal business 
strategy that can increase the value for the shareholders. According to the summary of 
outcomes depicted in Table 2, the proposed financial model suggests that the company 
should have a higher ratio of FBI than the current business model. As explained in the 
model specification above, the net interest income growth constraint is incorporated in 
the model to ensure that the company maintains the sustainability of all the possible 
sources of its interest income while performing other banking activities. Accordingly, 
as the model is developed within the optimization framework, the optimal ratio of FBI 
is generated from the best combination of various financial activities, i.e., interest-
income-related and non-interest-related activities, which can maximize the value for 
the shareholders(Beck et al. 2013). 
In addition to the FBI ratio, the fragility of a bank can also be reduced by making 
loans that are financed relatively heavily by deposits which are not prematurely 
withdrawn (Song and Thakor 2007). The effectiveness of this strategy can be 
determined by maintaining the proportion of loans to deposits, which is reflected in 
the Loans-to-Deposits Ratio (LTDR). The results generally show that the developed 
model proposes a higher proportion of loans-to-deposits (between 1.4053 and 1.6178) 
to preserve the funding requirement for safeguarding the deposits earned from 
customers and, on the other hand, securing the loans made by a bank. The results of 
the proposed model reflect the optimal liquidity management policy of a bank, as it 
provides the optimal composition of loans and deposits that reduces potential agency 
problems among stakeholders, particularly investors, customers, and depositors (Koch 
and MacDonald 2006; Mullineux 2006; Lange et al. 2013). 
Furthermore, the management should preserve the high quality of the assets to 
maintain operational efficiency and secure their bank's position in the industry. 
Accordingly, the Loans Ratio (LR) constraints are incorporated into the model to 
ensure that the bank's loan ratio lies within the optimal range of the minimum assets' 
profitability and the maximum loans allowed, to avoid any liquidity problems (Rezaee 
2011). Table 2 depicts that, to maintain its operational efficiency and profitability, the 
loans proportion of the total earnings assets should be reduced within the optimal 
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range suggested by the proposed financial model. This is shown by the lower level of 
LR resulting from the financial model, compared to the actual LR based on the 
financial statements. This result implies that the management is required to uphold the 
LR at a minimum of 62.54% and a maximum of 66.96% (suggested by the proposed 
model) to protect their company's financial position from liquidity risk exposure and 
hence preserving their company's financial stability in the future. 
The optimal business combination and improved organizational efficiency 
discussed above can lead to higher profitability levels. This is indicated by the 
generally higher value of Net Income (NI), Net Interest Income (NII), Net Interest 
Margin (NIM) and Return on Equity (ROE) resulting from the proposed financial 
models. The successfulness of the company in maintaining its financial strength 
through the proposed financial models is also shown by the generally higher value of 
the Return on Assets (ROA) and the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) produced by the 
proposed financial model as depicted in Table 2. This suggests that the optimal 
proportion of LR and the FBI in the operating activities proposed by the developed 
financial model can help the management to improve the efficiency of operational 
activities by diversifying risk onto more controlled interest-earning assets. 
Furthermore, the result also suggests that from the business strategy proposed by the 
model, the company can maintain its capital adequacy to absorb unanticipated losses 
from liquidity risks and ensure the sustainability of its financial strength (Mulbert 
2013). 
 
Agency theory implications 
The financial model developed in this study emphasizes on the benefit of integrating 
sound accounting system into financial strategies within a framework of agency 
theory. The focus of this study is investigating the way the integrated model can 
strengthen the financial position and hence improve the financial performance 
reflected in the company value. Based on the model testing, the results show that the 
proposed model can generally improve the financial performance, as discussed above 
and provide confidence for the existing and potential investors in making their 




economic decisions (Aretz and Bartram 2010; Brown et al. 2011). This implies that 
the financial model developed in this study can improve the informational content of 
the accounting outcomes provided for users, including shareholders, creditors, and 
depositors; thus, it can signal a company's excellent reputation in the market. In this 
way, the financial model can be used to reduce the agency problems that may arise 
from the information asymmetry by providing more reliable accounting information as 
a basis for making economic decisions. 
Furthermore, Table 2 depicts that the financial model produces lower agency 
costs than the existing condition of the company, hence succeeds in mitigating the 
agency problems. This argument is supported by results of model testing, particularly 
in the improvement in the management’s efficiency in utilizing the assets entrusted by 
the investors, which is shown by higher Earnings-to-Assets (ETA) and. Moreover, the 
Table also shows that the company produce higher Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE), 
as well as higher level of dividend that should be paid for shareholders (with a range 
of 2,412.86 to 4,536.62), compared to the original dividend policy of the company 
(with a range of 1,738.35 to 3,211.71). The increase in the dividend level is also 
accompanied by the increase of incentives level to be paid to the executives (𝑋3), as 
shown in Table 1. These results strongly indicate that the proposed financial model 
can align the interest of shareholders and management, by motivating the managers to 
take more actions to improve the company’s performance; hence this can increase the 
managers’ rewards and maximize the shareholders’ wealth at the same time (Jensen 









Table 2. The Comparison of the Optimal Financial Outcomes 
 Optimal Results of the Financial Model 
              
Year 
Business Model Shareholders' Interest  Profitability Stability and Risk Management 
FBI LTDR FCFE ETA Dividend CIR NII NIM ROE 
Earning 
Assets 
CAR ROA LR 
1 0.8612 1.5697      5,138.37  0.0201 2,412.86 0.1774 14,317.13 0.0278 0.1567 515,208.44 0.1386 0.0114 0.6254 
2 0.8457 1.6178    11,522.10  0.0159 3,571.03 0.2267 16,757.69 0.0248 0.1777 676,054.76 0.1555 0.0100 0.6696 
3 0.8787 1.4053    10,957.85  0.0162 3,963.84 0.1906 19,447.14 0.0248 0.2256 784,932.89 0.1559 0.0118 0.6420 
4 0.8906 1.6046      5,655.70  0.0129 4,162.04 0.1843 23,833.72 0.0253 0.2500 941,670.25 0.1715 0.0124 0.6382 
5 0.8815 1.4648    34,733.24  0.0116 4,536.62 0.1598 21,791.97 0.0196 0.2280 1,112,992.53 0.1577 0.0110 0.6434 
Ave. 0.8715 1.5324 13,601.45 0.0153 3,729.28 0.1878 19,229.53 0.0244 0.2076 806,171.77 0.1558 0.0113 0.6437 
              











       






 Book Value Based on Financial Statement 
                  
Year 
Business Model Shareholders' Interest  Profitability Stability and Risk Management 
FBI LTDR FCFE ETA Dividend CIR NII NIM ROE 
Earning 
Assets 
CAR ROA LR 
1 0.8362 1.2655 -79.00 0.0126 1,738.35 0.2108 10,301.00 0.0216 0.1651 476,703.00 0.0807 0.0086 0.7522 
2 0.8139 1.3171 2,731.00 0.0125 2,621.55 0.2202 11,922.00 0.0215 0.1695 555,522.00 0.0915 0.0090 0.7635 
3 0.8460 1.2466 3,011.00 0.0115 2,918.27 0.2055 12,607.00 0.0217 0.1760 580,112.50 0.1001 0.0098 0.7487 
4 0.8405 1.2011 5,612.00 0.0114 3,123.00 0.2050 13,122.00 0.0215 0.1802 611,006.00 0.1001 0.0103 0.7319 
5 0.8201 1.2116 -837.00 0.0117 3,211.71 0.2285 13,934.00 0.0215 0.1767 648,504.00 0.1024 0.0105 0.7384 
Ave. 0.8313 1.2484 2,087.60 0.0119 2,722.58 0.2140 12,377.20 0.0216 0.1735 574,369.50 0.0950 0.0096 0.7469 
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7. Plausibility of the Results and Generalization of the Model 
Validation of the Model 
The financial model developed and presented in this study is thoroughly examined by some 
rigorous, structured validation procedures. The results of the model testing are being validated 
through two steps, i.e., validation experiments and validation test, to ensure that the model's 
solutions have reasonably reflected the real outcomes (McCarl and Spreen 2011), as discussed 
below. 
a. Validation experiments: prediction experiment. This type of experiment is the common 
validation test performed in the previous mathematical programming research, such as 
Barnett et al. (1982) and Brink and McCarl (1979). In this test, the model is examined to 
see whether or not the results are close enough to the real observed outcomes. Based on the 
observation, several key performance indicators resulting from the developed financial 
model exist between the minimum and maximum values of the actual performance 
indicators of the observed company. Moreover, other indicators which fall outside the 
minimum and maximum range are still within the standard deviation of the value of actual 
outcomes. The summary of the predictive experiment is shown in Table 3. 
b. Validation test: association test. A further step in the model's validation is performing an 
association test, to examine the degree of correspondence between the achieved outcomes 
from the model's solutions and the actual outcomes. This test is essential to ensure that the 
set of results from the model are plausible and similar to the observed actual outcomes so 
that the developed financial model can be generalized(McCall and Spreen 2011). 
Following the study by Beck, this study applied a regression technique to measure the 
association of the outcomes with the observed values. The regression test result is depicted 
in Table 4. Based on the table, the values resulting from the association test indicate a 
strong association between the model's results and the observed values, i.e., close to 0 for 
the intercept and close to 1 for the slope (McCarl and Spreen 2011). Thus, the developed 
model can be justified as a valid model. 
Based on these procedures, the model satisfies all the assertions necessary to satisfy the 
validation requirements. Moreover, based on the predictive experiments (Table 3) and the 
association test (Table 4), the model is numerically valid and reasonably reflects the real 
outcomes of the observed object. Therefore, the results of the model can be considered to be 








Table 3.  
Summary of the Predictive Experiment Results 
Financial 
Indicators 
Company Statistical Figure* Results of 
Model Minimum Maximum Mean Variance Std. Dev 
FBI 0.7234 0.8460 0.8056 0.0012 0.0349 0.8715 
LTDR 1.1606 1.4962 1.2898 0.0130 0.1139 1.5324 
OHC 0.0128 0.0204 0.0145 0.0000 0.0026 0.0110 
CIR 0.2050 0.3402 0.2340 0.0015 0.0383 0.1878 
ROE 0.1148 0.1953 0.1715 0.0004 0.0212 0.2076 
NIM 0.0215 0.0246 0.0222 0.0000 0.0011 0.0244 
ROA 0.0084 0.0113 0.0102 0.0000 0.0010 0.0113 
Loans ratio 0.6189 0.7635 0.7221 0.0017 0.0411 0.6437 
CET 1 ratio 0.0000 0.0820 0.0461 0.0017 0.0415 0.1181 
Tier 1 ratio 0.0714 0.1024 0.0896 0.0002 0.0150 0.1393 
Total capital ratio 0.0966 0.1170 0.1095 0.0001 0.0099 0.1558 
ATO 0.0166 0.0189 0.0183 0.0000 0.0008 0.0103 
ETA 0.0114 0.0126 0.0119 0.0000 0.0005 0.0153 
* Based on 10-years historical data 
 
Table 4.  




Generalization of the Model 
This study has developed a new financial optimization model embedding some crucial 
issues in business to formulate a set of appropriate financial strategies, which is based on the 
general principles of corporate finance and accounting. The specified objective function and 
constraints of the model are based on the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
and reflect the interrelationship of accounts presented in a company's financial reports. The 
constraints are specified by following the general theories of accounting and finance. The 
objective function of the model is depicted by the maximization of equity value through a 
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model using Dividend per Share (DPS) as the proxy for the cash 
flow paid to equity holders. The applicability of the cost of equity is calculated through the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), as the discounting factors in the model reflect the real 
economic and market risks faced by the company and hence represent business reality. The 
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constraints of the model also incorporate relevant regulations as imposed by the global 
regulatory bodies. Hence the financial model proposed in this study can be implemented by 
other companies globally. Furthermore, this study is conducted through structured stages, hence 
the modeling approach adopted in this study can provide a powerful method to achieve the 
objective of the financial modeling. Moreover, the financial model proposed in this study is also 
simulated and tested through a numerical application, based on a real case study approach, to 
examine the applicability of the model in a real-life business problem. Therefore, the modeling 
approach proposed by this study can be justified as a sufficient and an appropriate approach to 
be adopted by other companies. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper proposes a corporate financial model for formulating financial strategies in a 
banking company within the framework of agency theory and accounting information system. 
This study constructs the model as a prescriptive financial optimization problem of the 
corporate financial management via the organizational design framework. The model is used to 
study the relationships between agency theory, information asymmetry, accounting information, 
and company value. The model specifies the objective function as maximizing the shareholders' 
value, subject to a set of constraints representing the managers and other stakeholders' interests. 
This study simulates the model with a numerical implementation that shows how the integrated 
financial model can propose optimal financial strategies to ensure efficient financial 
management, mitigate agency problems and improve the company's value. The developed 
model is operational as it satisfies some validation tests and provides plausible results and 
implications. 
While the proposed financial model is a contribution to multidisciplinary literature, it 
emphasizes numerous opportunities for future research. Possible extensions to the model 
include (but are not limited to): 1) integrating the wide-spectrum risks on banks; 2) integrating 
other contemporary issues in accounting and finance, such as fair value accounting, disclosure 
and risk management; 3) forming constraints based on asset-liability management, cf. 
Kosmidou and Zopounidis (2004); 4) replacing other proxies for the objective functions rather 
than maximizing the value per share of equity, and 5) shifting the model into a stochastic model 
to accommodate the uncertainty issue in business. The model is sufficiently flexible to be 
adapted to other strategic policies regarding the interests of decision makers. 
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APPENDIX 1. LIST OF VARIABLES AND PARAMETERS 
I. Unknown Variables 
 A. Independent variables of the objective function 
  𝑑𝑡 : Dividend paid in period t 
 B. Constraint variables 
 1) 𝑋11𝑡 : Loans, bills discounted and other receivables in period t 
 2) 𝑋12𝑡 : Cash and liquid assets in period t 
 3) 𝑋13𝑡 : Receivables due from other financial institutions in period t 
 4) 𝑋14𝑡 : Securities in period t 
 5) 𝑋21𝑡 : Deposits and other public borrowings in period t 
 6) 𝑋22𝑡 : Payables due to other financial institutions in period t 





: Loan capital in period t 
: Remuneration paid for executives in period t 
II. Parameters provided by management 
 A. Accounting parameters 
 1) 𝑁𝐼𝑡 : Net income in period t 




 2) 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑡 : Interest income in period t 
 3) 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡 : Interest expenses in period t 
 4) 𝑂𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑡 : Other operating income in period t 
 5) 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑡 : Impairment expenses in period t 
 6) 𝑂𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑡 : Operating expenses, other than remuneration expense, in period t 
 7) 𝐶𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡 : Corporate tax in period t 
 8) 𝑃𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡 : Policyholder tax in period t 
 9) 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐼𝐴𝑡 : Total non-interest earnings assets in period t 
 10) 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐼𝐿𝑡 : Total non-interest bearing liabilities in period t 
 11) 𝑆𝐶𝑡 : Share capital in period t 
 12) 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡 : Reserves in period t 
 13) 𝑅𝑃𝑡 : Retained profit in period t 
 14) ∆𝑅𝑃𝑡 : The change of retained profit in year t 
 15) 𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑡 : Net cash inflows in period t 
 16) 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 : Net cash flow from operating activities in period t 
 17) 𝐶𝐹𝐼𝑡 : Net cash flow from investing activities in period t 
 18) 𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑡 : Net cash flow from financing activities in period t 
 19) 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 : Property, plant, and equipment in period t 
 20) 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑡 : Intangible assets in period t 
 21) 𝐶𝐴𝐷𝑡 : Cash available for dividends in period t 
 22) 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡 : Return on equity in period t 
 23) 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑡 : Net interest margin in period t 
 24) 𝐸𝑅𝑡 : Efficiency ratio in period t 
 25) 𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑡 : Net interest income in period t 
 26) 𝐿𝑅𝑡 : Loans ratio in period t 
 27) 𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑅𝑡 : Loans to deposits ratio in period t 
 28) 𝑇𝐴𝑡 : The total assets in period t 
 29) 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑡 : Accumulated other comprehensive income in period t 
 B. Financial parameters and definition 
 1) 𝑘𝑒 : Cost of equity capital 
 2) 𝑔 : The constant growth rate in perpetuity expected for the dividends 
 3) 𝛿𝑡 : The dividend payout ratio in period t 
 4) 𝑎𝑡 : Fixed component of the remuneration paid in period t 
 5) 𝜒𝑡 : Variable-compensation payout ratio in period t 
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 6) 𝑅𝐸𝑥min(𝑡) : Lower limit for the executives' incentives in period t 
 7) 𝑅𝐸𝑥max (𝑡)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ : Upper limit for the executives' incentives in period t 
 8) 𝜑𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑡 : Minimum dividend growth in period t over period t-1 
 9) 𝜑𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑡 : Minimum revenue growth rate in period t over period t-1 
 10) 𝐿𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 : Lower limit for the loans ratio 
 11) 𝐿𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ : Upper limit for the loans ratio  
 12) 𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ : Permitted/required value of the loans to deposits ratio in period t 
 13) 𝜑𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡 : Minimum assets growth rate in period t 
 C. Economic parameters 
 1) 𝑅𝑓 : Risk free rate 
 2) 𝛽 : Market risk 
 3) 𝑅𝑚 : Market return 
 4) 𝑦𝑖 : The yield on the i
th asset 
 5) 𝑖𝑗 : The interest rate on the j
th liability 
 6) 𝜏𝑡 : The corporate tax rate in the period t 
 7) 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑑(𝑡) : Return on equity of the industry average in period t 
 8) 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑑(𝑡) : Net interest margin of the industry average in period t 
 9) 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑(𝑡) : Efficiency ratio of the industry average in period t 
 
